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The appellant submits the following Reply Brief 
pursuant to Rule 24(c) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
(REPLYING TO RESPONDENTS' POINT I) 
RIDDLE'S CLAIM IS NOT 
BARRED BY UTAH CODE ANN. §35-1-60 
The respondents rely on statutory language which has 
been specifically amended to support their claim that Riddle's 
claim is barred by Utah Code Ann. §35-1-60 ("Section 60"). 
They cite Bambrough v. Bethers, 552 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1976) for 
the proposition that "a worker can be hired and paid by a 
subcontractor, but still be an employee of the general 
contractor." The Court in Bambrough cites Smith v. Brown, 493 
P.2d 994 (Utah 1972) as authority for that holding. 
Both Bambrough and Smith were decided under the "same 
employment" language of Utah Code Ann. §35-1-62 ("Section 62"). 
As explained in the Appellant's Brief, before 1975, this Court 
used the expansive definition of "statutory employer" of Utah 
Code Ann. §35-1-42 ("Section 42") to determine who was "in the 
same employment" under Section 62 and immune from tort 
liability. It was this judicial interpretation thatf in 1975, 
prompted the Legislature to amend Section 62 to clarify those 
subject to tort liability. 
Decisions like Bambrough, decided before the 1975 
amendment language, are not properly relied upon in determining 
the issues before this Court on this appeal. 
The respondents claim that "Riddle and Mays are co-
employees of Owens-Corning." (Respondents' Brief, p. 7.) This 
claim can only be based on the statutory employer definition of 
Section 42. Certainly, Owens-Corning was not the actual 
employer of Mays when this accident happened. That Owens-
Corning was once the actual employer of Mays is irrelevant to 
the determination of Mays's employment status when this 
accident happened. 
The 1975 amendments to Section 62 make it clear that 
the expansive statutory employer definition of Section 42 is 
not to be used in determining those parties immune from tort 
liability under Section 60. Riddle and Mays, therefore, are 
not co-employees of Owens-Corning for tort claim purposes and 
Riddle's claim is not barred by Section 60. 
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POINT II 
(REPLYING TO RESPONDENTS' POINT II) 
THE POLICY OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
ACT ALLOWS RIDDLE TO PURSUE THIS TORT CLAIM 
The respondents assert that the policy of the 
Workers' Compensation Act should prevent an employee of the 
general contractor from suing a subcontractor or that 
subcontractor's employee and cite Smith as support for that 
position. They fail, however, to cite the full discussion of 
policy explained in Smith. After stating the purpose of the 
Workers' Compensation Act, as quoted by the respondents, the 
Court continues: 
The other side of the coin is the 
correlated important purpose of assuring 
employers that if they provide this 
protection for their employees, the 
employers will themselves be protected 
against the possibility of exorbitant 
claims for injuries. The reasonable and 
fair concomitant of the foregoing is that 
inasmuch as the injured employee has the 
protection just mentioned with respect to 
his employer, he must forego the privilege 
of suing the employer. 
Id. at 157. 
In other words, to the extent an employer, including 
a statutory employer, becomes responsible for compensation 
benefits to an injured worker, that employer should be immune 
from tort liability. The appellant contends that according to 
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the policy explained in Smith and the current language of the 
Workers' Compensation Act, an injured worker may pursue tort 
claims against anyone, even one qualifying as the injured 
worker's statutory employer, who does not actually provide 
workers' compensation benefits to the injured worker. 
MSI exercised no supervision or control over Kenneth 
Riddle. MSI cannot, therefore, qualify as Riddle's statutory 
employer under Section 4 2 and could never be obligated to 
Riddle for compensation benefits. Under those circumstances, 
there is no policy for granting MSI tort immunity. 
The respondents argue that the "upstream/downstream" 
contractor distinction ignores "the whole concept of fairness 
as outlined in Smith." (Respondents' Brief, p. 9.) To the 
contrary, that distinction helps define the fairness 
contemplated by the Workers' Compensation Act by allowing tort 
claims against parties who cannot, by statutory definition, be 
responsible for an injured worker's compensation benefits. 
Like MSI cannot be responsible to Riddle for compensation 
benefits in this case. 
Regarding Shupe v. Wasatch Electric Co., 546 P.2d 896 
(Utah 1976), the respondents claim that the 1975 amendments to 
Section 62 "had no bearing on the Shupe decision." 
(Respondents' Brief, p. 10.) That is true only to the extent 
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that the Court held that the amendments did not apply in Shupe 
because the accident happened before the amendments took effect 
and that the amendments did not apply retroactively. The 
respondents cannot, however, ignore that the majority opinion 
in Shupe states that "the amendment if applicable would leave 
the plaintiffs in court." Id. at 898. 
The respondents place much emphasis on Hinds v. Herm 
Hughes & Sons, Inc., 577 P.2d 561 (Utah 1978). The plaintiff 
reiterates that to rule in his favor on this appeal does not 
require this Court to overrule Hinds. Hinds does not control 
this appeal. 
The respondents further claim that because Section 62 
states that only those not occupying an "employee-employer 
relationship" may maintain a civil action, the "statutory 
employer" definition of Section 42 "must be applied to 
determine an employer-employee relationship." (Respondents' 
Brief, p. 12.) Why? Such an interpretation is directly 
contrary to Section 62, which states that tort claim liability 
is to be determined "notwithstanding the provisions of Section 
35-1-42." The appellant asserts that the "employer-employee 
relationship" language of Section 62 means actual employer and 
that the "statutory employer" definition of Section 42 should 
not be considered in defining that relationship. That was the 
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purpose and intent of the 1975 Legislative amendments to 
Section 62. 
Accepting the appellant's position would not, as the 
respondents suggest, require MSI to pay worker's compensation 
premiums for the employees of every subcontractor on a given 
work site. If MSI exercises no supervision or control over 
those subcontractors, MSI could not qualify as a statutory 
employer of those workers and would never be responsible for 
their workers' compensation benefits. MSI would, however, be 
subject to tort liability for injuries to those workers caused 
by MSI's negligence. Such is the balancing of interests dis-
cussed in Smith. MSI wants it both ways. It wants immunity 
from tort liability while having no obligation to provide 
workers' compensation benefits to the injured worker. That 
kind of protection is not contemplated by the Workers' 
Compensation Act. 
Finally, the respondents claim that: 
It makes no sense to afford limited 
liability to entities qualifying as 
statutory employers under the Workmen's 
Compensation Act, while denying such 
limited liability to subcontractors and 
others working on a site with an injured 
employee who have much less control over, 
and even less contact with, the injured 
employee than the protected statutory 
employer has. 
(Respondents' Brief, p. 13.) 
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That is precisely the point and it makes good sense. 
Those subcontractors with no control over and contact with an 
injured worker will never be called upon to provide that worker 
with compensation benefits and should, therefore, be subject to 
tort liability if negligent. The statutory employer, on the 
other hand, is subject to pay those benefits and, if called 
upon to do so, should be immune from tort liability. It makes 
sense to treat them differently under the statute. 
POINT III 
(REPLYING TO RESPONDENTS' POINT III) 
THE "LOANED SERVANT DOCTRINE" 
DOES NOT APPLY TO THIS CASE BECAUSE 
MSI EXERCISED NO CONTROL OVER RIDDLE 
The "loaned servant doctrine" does not apply to every 
situation where workers labor closely together on a project. 
The "lender" employer must surrender and the "borrower" 
employer must assume the power of supervision and control over 
the loaned employee. Bambrough v. Bethers, 552 P.2d 1286, 1292 
(Utah 1976)(citing Fisher v. Seattle, 62 Wash.2d 800, 384 P.2d 
852 (1963)). 
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While this Court in Bambrouqh held that it is not 
necessary for the original employer to surrender all control 
over the loaned employee, the borrower employer must exercise 
some degree of control over the alleged loaned employee for the 
doctrine to apply. In Bambrouqh, this Court found that 
transfer of control to have occurred when Bambrough's original 
employer, in response to Bambrough asking whether he should 
help transfer the load, said, "If that's their procedure, you 
do it. " I_d. at 1292. 
MSI exercised no such control over Riddle at any 
time. The critical inquiry in determining whether the "loaned 
servant doctrine" should apply is the location of the power to 
control the servant. Petrick v. State, 22 Wash.App. 163, 589 
P.2d 250 (1977) . 
The respondents claim that, "Because of this close 
working relationship with MSI and Mays, Riddle's ability to 
recover against respondents should be limited to benefits under 
the Act." (Respondents' Brief, p. 15.) The control, or right 
to control, in the case of a loaned servant must, however, 
create a relationship of subordination rather than a 
relationship of cooperation. Pichler v. Pacific Mechanical 
Constr., 1 Wash.App. 447, 462 P.2d 960 (1969). 
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Because MSI exercised no supervision or control over 
Riddle, the "loaned servant doctrine" does not apply to this 
case. Riddle is allowed to pursue his tort claim against Mays 
and MSI. 
POINT IV 
(REPLYING TO RESPONDENTS' POINT IV) 
GENUINE ISSUES OF FACT EXIST REGARDING 
OWENS-CORNING'S CONTROL OVER MSI WHICH, 
IF RELEVANT, MUST BE DECIDED BY A JURY 
Riddle's deposition testimony, taken as a whole, 
creates issues of fact regarding control which, if relevant, 
must be decided by a jury- To simply say, as the respondents 
do, that Riddle said he supervised work done by MSI does not 
dispose of the issue. As detailed in the Appellant's Brief, 
pages 21 to 23, Riddle also testified that he did not supervise 
the work of Alan Mays; that Maynard Crossland, a part-owner of 
MSI, supervised and instructed Mays; that Riddle had no 
authority to fire Mays without the approval of Crossland; and 
that MSI, not Owens-Corning, paid Mays from MSI's payroll. 
The question of control is a question of fact for the 
jury- Moloso v- State, 644 P.2d 205 (Alaska 1982). The 
respondents attempt to establish control by taking one or two 
statements made by Riddle during his deposition, while 
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ignoring other sworn testimony creating issues of fact for the 
jury. 
The appellant restates his position that, for the 
reasons set forth in his main brief, the issue of Owens-
Corning's control over Mays and/or MSI is irrelevant to the 
determination of the issiies presented by tMs appeal. 
DATED this | 'V day of VV\filflfy^ , 1989. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney for Plaintiff/ 
Appellant 
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